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█ Riassunto  Mi muovo dunque sono. Alcune osservazioni su “L’importanza della percezione dei propri movimenti 
nel mondo per il senso di identità personale” di  Haselager, Broens e Quilici Gonzalez  -  L’argomento proposto da 
Haselager, Broens e Quilici Gonzalez in The Importance of Sensing One’s Movements in the World for the Sense of 
Personal Identity consta di tre tesi fondamentali, che possono essere così riassunte: (1) al cuore 
dell’autocoscienza umana sta il linguaggio o il pensiero, ma il senso del corpo; (2) la dicotomia tradizionale tra 
sensi esterni e sensi interni è falsa; (3) non c’è un primato del cervello sul resto del corpo in rapporto al senso di 
identità che ogni essere umano possiede. Il presente studio si propone di mostrare che, mentre la tesi (1) è per-
fettamente convincente, le tesi (2) e (3) devono essere parzialmente rivisitate, poiché troppo compromesse con 
un tipo di anti-rappresentazionalismo à la Brook. Difatti, molti risultati sperimentali (si pensi soprattutto al ri-
flesso vestibulo-oculare) mostrano, diversamente da quanto sostenuto in (2), che anche a livello puramente 
percettivo il cervello distingue tra sé e mondo esterno. Esistono inoltre esperimenti che confermano 
l’“importanza”del corpo per la cognizione e l’interazione costante tra corpo e cervello anche per quel che con-
cerne l’esecuzione di compiti cognitivi, questi stessi esperimenti mostrano al contempo, diversamente da quan-
to sostenuto in (3), che l’influenza del movimento corporeo sulle aree associative della corteccia non è diretta-
mente dovuta agli schemi motori che dirigono il movimento corporeo ma a rappresentazioni cerebrali di “alto 
livello” delle azioni, ognuna delle quali può essere eseguita da schemi motori differenti. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Movimento; Anti-rappresentazionalismo; Identità; Senso corporeo; Schema motorio. 
 
█ Abstract  The position taken by Haselager, Broens, and Quilici Gonzalez in The Importance of Sensing 
One’s Movements in the World for the Sense of Personal Identity consists in three fundamental theses which 
can be summarized as follows: (1) The fundamental core of human self-consciousness is not language or 
thought but the body sense; (2) The traditional dichotomy between external and internal senses is false; (3) 
There is no prominence of the brain over the rest of the body with regard to the sense of identity that every 
human being has. This paper aims at showing that – while thesis (1) is perfectly convincing – theses (2) and 
(3) must be revisited in part since they are too committed to the kind of anti-representationalism proposed 
by Brooks. In fact, several experimental findings (see above all the vestibulo-ocular reflex) show – in contrast 
to (2) – that the brain distinguishes even at a purely perceptual level between self and external world. More-
over, while other experiments do confirm the “importance” of the body for cognition and the steady interac-
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tion between the brain and the body including for the execution of cognitive tasks, they also show – in con-
trast to (3) – that the influence of bodily movement on the associative areas of the cortex is not directly due 
to the motor schemata that direct bodily movements but to “higher” brain representations of actions each of 
which can be executed by different motor schemata. 
KEYWORDS: Movement; Anti-representationalism; Identity; Bodily Sense; Motor Scheme. 
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HASELAGER, BROENS, AND QUILICI GON-
ZALEZ aim to show «the importance of sens-
ing one’s own movements for the develop-
ment of a “basic, non-conceptual sense of self” 
and at the same time they want to argue 
against “the traditional dichotomy between 
so-called external and internal senses”, agree-
ing with Gibson that perception of the self 
and of the environment invariably go togeth-
er. By referring to J.J. Gibson and to M. 
Sheets-Johnstone’s book The Primacy of 
Movement the Authors make clear that their 
conception of the self is a further development 
of a very general theoretical framework to 
which philosophers such as J. Bermùdez and S. 
Gallagher, neuroscientists like A. Damasio 
and experts of robotics like R.A. Brooks have 
been strongly contributing for twenty years. 
Their work changed the image that we human 
beings have of ourselves. 
From this earlier research it is easy to arrive 
at the claim that I am not a mind which con-
trols the movements of my body as a helmsman 
drives his ship (according to the famous image 
by which Aristotle criticized Plato’s conception 
of the soul). Moreover we must not confuse – 
the Authors emphasize – the “body image” that 
we adult human beings have of our own bodies  
(especially if the bodily movements we are re-
ferring to are consciously controlled and our 
attention is focused on what we are doing) with 
the basic “body sense” that automatically ac-
companies all of our motor responses and is 
possessed by very small children as well.1 
If you do not confuse the body image with 
the body sense you can clearly understand that 
you must reject the primacy given by cognitivists 
to the brain over the rest of the body. According 
to Haselager, Broens, and Quilici Gonzalez, 
the body is doing more than just translat-
ing brain output into movements as if it is 
executing commands. The body does more 
than merely selecting sensory information 
and channeling it back into the brain. 
Chiel and Beer provide many examples in-
dicating the importance of the body for 
cognition.2 
 
In other words, the Authors implicitly crit-
icize the image of the mind that D.C. Dennett 
has called Cartesian Theater:3 an image that 
according to the anti-cognitivist stream of 
thought Haselager, Broens, and Quilici Gon-
zalez belong to remains wrong even if, unlike 
Descartes, the mind is no longer considered an 
immaterial substance separable from the brain 
and it is on the contrary identified with the 
activity of the brain itself. 
Even if my mind is identical to the activity 
of my brain I am not in any case a mind/brain 
that in rapid succession (a) receives infor-
mation from the periphery of the body to 
which it is connected, (b) works with this in-
formation in the associative areas of the cor-
tex in order to obtain an internal objective 
representation of the external world and com-
bines this representation of the world with the 
subjective goals suggested by the cortical areas 
that implement memory, emotions, innate 
needs and any other drive to act and (c) final-
ly, gives the motor-neurons the command to 
execute bodily movements oriented to realize 
the goals previously selected. 
According to the Authors this image of the 
mind is deeply wrong in the light of empirical 
data offered by neuroscience, cognitive psy-
chology and robotic simulation of human be-
havior since it represents human beings as 
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similar to robots internally controlled by com-
puters that previously calculate the move-
ments to be executed and only afterwards 
provide the command to the muscles and 
skeleton to passively execute the motor sche-
mata prepared by the brain. 
If human beings were indeed robots en-
dowed with a mind/brain program able to con-
struct an objective representation of the exter-
nal world (and possibly of their own body but 
only insofar as it is considered a body like any 
other external body) but devoid of any propri-
oceptive feedback from their own movements, 
their behavior could not be so effective, stable 
and at the same time flexible as it really is. As 
the Authors write: «it is because of propriocep-
tion and the body sense that we are able to 
move as fluently as we do».4 
The brain can drive the body only insofar 
as the body drives the brain through proprio-
ceptive feedback. This is the first step of 
Haselager, Broens, and Quilici Gonzalez’ the-
sis. The second one is that the existence of this 
kind of interaction between the brain and the 
rest of the body shows that Cognitivists pro-
pose a false conception of the relationship that 
human beings have with the world and are in-
duced by this first mistake to inevitably com-
mit a second mistake in maintaining a false 
conception of the image that we have of our-
selves, that is, a false conception of the self. 
According to the Authors on the one hand 
it is false that sensorimotor coordination pre-
supposes that the brain is able to construct an 
objective representation of the external world 
before acting, that is, a representation inde-
pendent of any possible action that one can ex-
ecute. As a matter of fact when one acts on ex-
ternal objects in many cases one simply reacts 
to the “affordances” given by sensory inputs. 
For example5 a goal keeper who saves a 
shot must react so quickly to the visual stimu-
lus of the oncoming ball that he does not have 
the time to construct a complete objective im-
age of the ball that he is trying to catch with its 
spherical form, white color etc. He reacts only 
to “something to be caught”. In the phenome-
nal world of an agent, a material object is pri-
marily only the affordance to execute some 
movements. 
On the other hand if the external world in 
which we move and on which we act is primarily 
for us only a certain amount of affordances for 
possible movements we too are for us (that is, 
according to the basic sense that we have of our-
selves) first of all the authors of such move-
ments. Therefore, it is not the ability to speak or 
to think which is the primary source of self-
consciousness but the ability to move. Whereas 
Descartes said “I think, therefore I am” the Au-
thors implicitly suggest to correct him by saying 
“I move, therefore I am”: 
 
having an identity is having the capacity to 
have “I”-experiences, these “I”-experiences 
need not require linguistic or conceptual 
capacities. Indeed, we follow Gallagher in 
suggesting that the moving body provides 
for a minimal self (at times also called a 
non-conceptual or “ecological” self) that is 
more basic than the reflexive, conceptual-
ized, consciously experienced self that is 
the primary focus of philosophy and most 
cognitive science.6 
 
Moreover, according to Haselager, Broens, 
and Quilici Gonzalez (who follow Sheets-
Johnston) such a non-conceptual ecological 
self is a product of proprioception, not its pre-
supposition. For example,7 let us assume that I 
want to open a window that is in front of me 
and I feel that I am able to do it. 
Such a feeling can obtain only because 
firstly I perceive myself as the author of simi-
lar actions in similar situations in the past and 
secondly, the sense of agency, qua first core of 
my self-consciousness, is based on the propri-
oception of my movements. I become con-
scious of myself (that is, self-conscious) by 
feeling that my body is moving. 
Therefore I do not perceive by propriocep-
tion that I am moving my body (or better, a 
body that I would perceive as my body only be-
cause I would be previously and directly sure 
that I am moving it). On the contrary I become 
conscious of myself as the author of my sponta-
I Move, Therefore I Am 
 
15 
neous movements only after I have discovered 
through proprioception that they have been ex-
ecuted. And only thanks to this ‘body sense’ a 
first image of myself as the author of such 
movements could be formed in my experience: 
 
the starting point of our investigation is 
formed by the idea of Sheets-Johnstone 
that “move” precedes the “I move” just as 
this precedes the “I can move”. As she says: 
‘Movement forms the I that moves before 
the I that moves forms movement’. It is 
important to note that the transition from 
“move” to “I move” is a process of discover-
ing our bodies through movement. The ba-
sis of our identity arises out of these spon-
taneous movements that happen to us be-
fore we make them happen. It is only at a 
later stage that attention can be focused at 
controlling the movements.8 
 
Haselager, Broens and Quilici Gonzalez’ 
conclusion is that «the proprioceptive sensing 
of our movements in the world constitutes the 
origin of our non-conceptual self. It is the 
body sense, not the body image that forms the 
foundation of our identity».9 However, ac-
cording to the Authors it would be a mistake 
to think that our non-conceptual self, since it 
is based on the proprioceptive sensing of our 
own body, is unrelated to the information that 
we receive from other senses: sight, hearing 
and so on. The opposite is true. As for the re-
lationship between consciousness of the world 
and consciousness of the self (that is, self-
consciousness) in the primary form of non-
conceptual body sense, the Authors quote 
Gibson and endorse his point of view: «per-
ception and proprioception are not alterna-
tives or opposing tendencies of experience but 
complementary experiences».10 
The Authors argue indeed «against a di-
chotomy between perception of self-movement 
and of the environment».11 Human beings 
with an impaired body sense – for example a 
patient known in literature as Ian Waterman 
(IW) – can only partially compensate for the 
lack of proprioception from their muscles by 
using visual feedback from their own move-
ments perceived as if they were the movements 
of another person.12 Moreover the lack of 
movement fluidity found in patients such as IW 
obtains also in robots. The reason is just the 
same: robots usually have no proprioception. 
 
The situation robots without propriocep-
tion find “themselves” in can be compared 
to the situation of IW. That is, they may be 
equipped with an explicit representation of 
their physical selves, a body image, but 
they lack a body sense, allowing them to 
direct their bodies gracefully and without 
explicit and detailed attention.13 
 
To sum up, Haselager, Broens, and Quilici 
Gonzalez criticize many aspects of the too “in-
tellectual” image that Cognitivists have given 
of the self.  I think his thesis can be so summa-
rized: 
▶ The fundamental core of human self-
consciousness is not language or thought but 
the body sense, that is, the proprioception of 
the movements of one’s own body: «the 
origin of the sense of self stems from the sensi-
tivity to spontaneous movements»;14 
▶ The traditional dichotomy between in-
ternal and external senses is false: «perception 
of the self and of the environment invariably 
go together […] perception and propriocep-
tion continuously, simultaneously and interre-
latedly circle around the two poles of self and 
environment, they are reciprocal processes»;15 
▶ There is no prominence of the brain over 
the rest of the body with regard to the sense of 
identity that every human being has of himself. 
Unlike what is suggested by many authors (for 
example D. Parfit) with reference to thought 
experiments involving brain transplantation it 
is not true that I am identical to the mere psy-
chological continuity of my memory and that 
my personal identity resides in causally con-
nected brain states. If I woke up in another 
body I would be another person even if my 
brain was transplanted into that new body: 
 
this approach [that is, Parfit’s approach] 
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neglects profoundly the importance of the 
sense of one’s bodily movements in an en-
vironment for the experience of one’s self 
and identity.16 
 
Moreover, according to Haselager, Broens, 
and Quilici Gonzalez authors who recognize 
the role of the body in relation to personal 
identity and the self (such as A. Damasio) also 
put too much emphasis on the role of the 
brain and think that the body contributes to 
the construction of the self only insofar as the 
whole organism and its bodily movements are 
represented inside the brain: 
 
Although we agree with Damasio that the 
living body is an essential “deep root” for 
the self, we think that he too puts too much 
emphasis on the role of the brain. Indeed, 
we think that the body is of primary, not of 
secondary importance to the self.17 
 
I think that the point (1) of Authors’ thesis 
is on the whole empirically well founded and 
acceptable. Haselager, Broens, and Quilici 
Gonzalez show how traditional philosophical 
questions can be enlightened by cognitive 
neuroscience and robotics. However, I find it 
difficult to entirely accept points (2) and (3). 
As for point (2) it is indubitable that the imag-
es we have of ourselves and of the world are 
intertwined and that they are both based not 
in a contemplative perception of internal and 
external objective events or states but in a 
practical interaction between us and our envi-
ronment.  
More generally, it is plausible to maintain 
that every form of cognition stems from sen-
sorimotor coordination. However, this does 
not imply that we and our environment are 
present to us only as the terms of a relation 
(that is, as the two extremes of an interaction 
process) and that sensorimotor coordination 
processes do not need any distinct representa-
tions of the world and of the self. Haselager, 
Broens, and Quilici Gonzalez’ anticognitivism 
seems to be similar to R. Brooks’ anti-
representationalism or to D. Chalmers and A. 
Clark’s theory about the so-called “Extended 
Mind”.18 
Although the Authors reproach R. Brooks 
for not being interested in endowing his ro-
bots with proprioception mechanisms,19 in 
fact they seem to be very near to Brooks’ max-
im: «the best model of the world is the world 
itself».20  
Brooks’ robots directly react to the features 
of their environment without having at their 
disposal any internal “map” of the environment 
itself. In fact a Brook’s robot is a set of percep-
trons, that is, a set of two layer neural networks: 
every perceptron directly reacts to inputs of a 
certain kind without working out any interme-
diate step between input and output. Analo-
gously, according to Haselager, Broens and 
Quilici Gonzalez it is not the case that I need a 
certain image of myself to drive the movements 
of my body. On the contrary, I have a sense of 
myself after (and through) perceiving move-
ments of my body which are almost automati-
cally executed in the course of a primitive direct 
interaction with the environment. 
Moreover Haselager, Broens and Quilici 
Gonzalez’ conception of the brain-body rela-
tionship is close to the absence of borders that 
Chalmers and Clark see between the mind and 
its environment. According to Chalmers and 
Clark part of me is in the world I live in and I 
interact with. For example a big part of my 
knowledge is in the books I can consult on my 
bookshelf or in the files saved on my computer. 
If I am driving a car I can often find my way 
only thanks to road signs or a navigator with-
out having in my mind any map of the roads I 
am crossing. Similarly Haselager, Broens and 
Quilici Gonzalez maintain that I do not need 
any previous representation of myself to control 
the movements of my body. It is true instead 
that those movements are directly “me”. 
In my opinion this all is partly true and 
partly wrong. It is true that we need not have 
any objective representation of the world and 
of ourselves before we interact with it. Our 
representation of the world and of ourselves is 
not a presupposition of our ability to act on it. 
It is instead the result of our interaction with 
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the world. However, this does not prevent the 
results of previous interactions with the envi-
ronment from forming two distinct representa-
tions of the two poles of the sensorimotor co-
ordination process – the external world and 
the self – which can then play a central role 
not only in the execution of more complex 
successive acts as well as other types of basic 
sensorimotor coordination. 
The latter is evident in the vestibulo-ocular 
reflex (VOR).21 If you look at a video taken by 
a camera installed in a car during a rally you 
see that the image strongly oscillates. If you 
had been in the same car during the camera 
take you would have experiences this scene 
differently. You would have seen the street in 
front of you as rather stable while you were 
sensing that your body oscillated together 
with the car. During an actual rally, thanks to 
VOR, the movement of your eyes compensates 
for the movements of your head so that your 
eyes are always focused at the same point of 
the scene in front of you.  
This automatic adaptation of the position 
of your eyes is obtained because your brain 
applies information coming from the proprio-
ceptive feedback of your head movements to 
the retinal image of the street in the fovea of 
your eyes. 
It is noteworthy that the movement of ret-
inal images in the fovea of your eyes is just the 
same independently of whether it is brought 
about by a movement of the external object 
represented in the retinal image while your 
head is moving quickly or whether it is 
brought about, the other way round, by a 
movement of your head while the object is 
moving quickly.  
Therefore during a rally the oscillation of 
the retinal image of the road in the fovea is 
not passively received by your brain but ac-
tively interpreted – first of all in the light of 
further information coming from propriocep-
tion – as a consequence of the movement of 
your head, movement which must be compen-
sated for by the movement of your eyes.  
Therefore VOR shows that already at the 
low level of an automatic reflex the information 
coming from the eyes is actively analyzed by 
the brain in two components (the seen object 
and the seeing eye) which are the first step in 
the construction of two distinct conscious rep-
resentations: a representation of the external 
world (e.g. G. Edelman’s “complex scene”)22 
and a representation of the self.23 
To sum up, the example of the VOR empha-
sizes the importance of proprioception for the 
construction of the self. The VOR distinguishes 
a seen object from a seeing subject already at 
the low level of an automatic reflex. This is still 
compatible with Haselager, Broens and Quilici 
Gonzalez’ thesis. However, the VOR also shows 
that basic bodily movements such as reflexes 
need (and contribute to create) two distinct in-
ternal representations of the world and the self. 
Brook’s robot movements are so simple that 
they can work by means of a direct reaction to 
a certain amount of affordances offered by 
their environment and need no stable objective 
internal representation of their environment 
and of themselves. 
However, this is not the case for human 
beings whose flexible and multifunctional be-
havior not only requires continuous proprio-
ceptive feedback but also a stable multipur-
pose representation of the world and of them-
selves. In order to coordinate your actions you 
must sometimes know that two distinct af-
fordances to which you react in two different 
ways are offered by the same object.  
For example a soccer player “knows” (or 
better sees) that the ball he is stopping with 
his left foot is the same object he wants to kick 
with the right foot a second later. Analogous-
ly, you could not coordinate your actions if 
you did not have a sense of personal identity, 
that is, if you did not feel that you are the au-
thor of all these actions. Maybe D.C. Dennett 
is right and this feeling refers to a self that is 
only “fictive”.24 Nevertheless you need such a 
feeling in order to be a normal person. 
A similar criticism can also be made in rela-
tion to point (3) of Haselager, Broens, and 
Quilici Gonzalez’ thesis. According to them 
there is no prominence of the brain over the 
rest of the body with regard to the sense of 
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identity that every human being has of himself. 
In this case too it is indubitable that our brain 
could not work without proprioception from 
the periphery of the body and that such feed-
back is fundamental for our “I-perceptions”.  
Haselager, Broens, and Quilici Gonzalez 
are right about this. However, many experi-
ments show that what I perceive as an action 
of mine (and therefore what contributes to the 
construction of the self by sending my brain a 
feedback signal of itself) is not directly a bodi-
ly movement but its internal representation in 
my brain. 
Therefore, while it is true that bodily 
movements make an essential contribution to 
the construction of the self, they do this not 
directly but (at least in a large measure) 
through their “image” in the brain. 
For example, two experiments show that 
bodily movements certainly influence the activ-
ity of associative areas of the cortex through 
feedback and therefore confirm “the im-
portance of the body for cognition”. However, 
these experiments also tell us that such an in-
fluence is not directly due to the motor schema-
ta that direct bodily movements but to “higher” 
brain representations of these actions each of 
which can be executed by different motor 
schemata. I mean higher representations that 
are located not at the periphery of the body but 
in the cortex or in the spinal inter-neurons. 
The first experiment I am speaking of is 
the so-called “escargot-experiment”.25 It is one 
of the experiments which suggests the exist-
ence of the famous Mirror Neurons. The 
name of the experiment comes from the fact 
that reverse clamp tweezers are used in France 
to extract snails (“escargots” in French) from 
their shells. 
A macaque was trained to catch peanuts by 
two instruments: usual tweezers and reverse 
clamp tweezers.  In the former case the ma-
caque had to close its hand to catch a peanut, 
in the latter case it had to open it. The action 
was the same in both cases: catch a peanut. 
But the motor schemata that directed the 
movements were opposite in the two cases. 
Independently of which movement the ma-
caque was executing EEG recording from of a 
determined point of its cortex proved that in 
both cases the same mirror neurons fired! 
That is, the activity of these neurons 
proved on the one hand that pre-motor areas 
of the cortex have an important cognitive role 
in sensorimotor coordination (and this is on 
the whole in agreement with Haselager, 
Broens, and Quilici Gonzalez’ thesis). Howev-
er, the experiment also proved on the other 
hand that even at a relatively low level of the 
sensorimotor coordination process (in pre-
motor areas) there are neurons that do not di-
rectly implement motor-schemata but repre-
sent abstract actions (e.g. catching a peanut) 
whose execution can be realized by distinct (or 
even opposite) motor-schemata. 
Something similar was proved by an exper-
iment performed by E. Bizzi and colleagues.26 
In this experiment Bizzi proved that stimula-
tion of certain spinal inter-neurons of a dece-
rebrated frog did not always produce the same 
movement of one of its legs. On the contrary, 
by touching a point along the frog’s spinal 
cord a force field was generated. This field 
produced different movements of the leg in 
such a way that the leg always reached the 
same final point independently of its starting 
point. 
This experiment clearly shows that the in-
ter-neurons of a decerebrated frog are also not 
a simple switch able to spark off only a single 
automatic movement. They implement in-
stead the abstract representation of an action 
described in functional terms: that is, they 
spark off such a movement that, given any 
starting point whatsoever in a certain space, a 
determined final point is reached. 
Bodily movements play an important cog-
nitive role. But they do so only because in the 
central nervous system there are abstract rep-
resentations of these very peripheral move-
ments. In other words, the peripheral body 
does play an important cognitive role in di-
recting the interaction between an organism 
and its environment but it does so in a large 
measure only through a neural model of itself 
internal to the brain. 
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